arXiv:2605. 03357v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents.
By Gr\'egoire Lambrecht, Mathieu Lauri\`ere
Inducing cooperation among distributed agents is still a difficult problem in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in social dilemma situations. There, individual interests are misaligned with the common good and individual rationality leads to suboptimal group outcomes.
The paper proposes a mean‑field reinforcement learning framework that models rewards and transitions as functions of an unknown low‑dimensional aggregate statistic of a large agent population. By learning this low‑dimensional representation in an offline setting, the authors demonstrate a provable method for obtaining near‑optimal policies. Experiments on a one‑step routing game inspired by supply‑chain problems show that, with a fixed neural‑network size and optimization budget, the learned representation improves reward prediction and the quality of Nash equilibria compared to baselines that ignore population structure.
By Aditya Makkar, Benjamin Unger, Jeongyeol Kwon, Mathieu Lauri\`ere, Eugene Vinitsky, Yonathan Efroni
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
arXiv:2607. 04710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Inducing cooperation among distributed agents is still a difficult problem in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in social dilemma situations.
By Yu Wei, Yukiko Ogura, Yoshiyuki Ohmura, Ildefons Magrans de Abril, Hoshinori Kanazawa, Yasuo Kuniyoshi
arXiv:2403.05006v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Pluralistic alignment requires learning from feedback that reflects persistent and potentially conflicting stakeholder preferences while ulti...
By Huiying Zhong, Tianwei Gao, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, Weijie J. Su, Zhun Deng
The paper introduces a method for learning heterogeneous, individually conditioned utility functions—termed individuated utility—by leveraging rational choice theory. It presents a multi-stage architecture that estimates these functions from multimodal data and evaluates it on a large dataset of aesthetic judgments about automotive wheel designs. Results show that individuated models outperform universal utility models and foundation baselines, indicating that annotator disagreement reflects meaningful preference diversity.
By Shiwali Mohan, Matt Hong, Dule Shu, Aniek Fransen, Shabnam Hakimi, Matt Klenk
arXiv:2606. 18111v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fairness is an important aspect of decision-making in multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL), where policies must ensure both optimality and equity across multiple, potentially conflicting objectives.
By Umer Siddique, Peilang Li, Yongcan Cao
arXiv:2606. 16759v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study inverse reinforcement learning for discrete-time, infinite-horizon mean-field games (MFGs) under an average-reward criterion.
By \c{S}evket Kaan Alk{\i}r, Naci Sald{\i}, Berkay Anahtarc{\i}, Can Deha Kar{\i}ks{\i}z
arXiv:2608. 08604v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful framework for solving complex collaborative tasks, but it relies heavily on well-defined global reward functions.
By Ni Mu, Yao Luan, Yiqin Yang, Qing-Shan Jia
arXiv:2607. 16999v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Credit Assignment Problem (CAP) is fundamental to developing efficient and explainable Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents.
By Mingxuan Li, Kaizhan-Lee, Elias Bareinboim
The paper investigates the trade‑off between the costs of participating in federated learning (privacy, communication, compute) and the potential gains in model performance, framing this as a game‑theoretic problem of individual rationality versus autarky. It shows that clients can remain below their local‑training baseline for many rounds and that simply capping per‑round contributions harms learning. The authors propose a new mechanism that provides short‑term participation guarantees and personalized model evaluation, demonstrating theoretically and empirically that clients can avoid short‑term losses without significantly harming overall performance, even under moderate heterogeneity.
By Amin Meghrazi, Srinivasan Parthasarathy, Andrew Perrault