arXiv AI

Provable Pluralistic Alignment: Multi-Party RLHF under Offline Human Feedback

arXiv AI
Sep 1

Personalized Group Relative Policy Optimization for Heterogenous Preference Alignment

The paper introduces Personalized Group Relative Policy Optimization (P‑GRPO), a new alignment framework for large language models that separates advantage estimation from immediate batch statistics. By normalizing advantages using preference‑group‑specific reward histories instead of the concurrent generation group, P‑GRPO maintains contrastive signals for distinct user preferences. Experiments across various tasks show that P‑GRPO converges faster and yields higher rewards than standard GRPO, improving alignment with heterogeneous human preferences while preserving general capabilities.

By Jialu Wang, Heinrich Peters, Asad A. Butt, Navid Hashemi, Alireza Hashemi, Pouya M. Ghari, Joseph Hoover, James Rae, Morteza Dehghani
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 4

Towards Scaling Reinforcement Learning to Massive Populations: Learning Mean-Field Representations

The paper proposes a mean‑field reinforcement learning framework that models rewards and transitions as functions of an unknown low‑dimensional aggregate statistic of a large agent population. By learning this low‑dimensional representation in an offline setting, the authors demonstrate a provable method for obtaining near‑optimal policies. Experiments on a one‑step routing game inspired by supply‑chain problems show that, with a fixed neural‑network size and optimization budget, the learned representation improves reward prediction and the quality of Nash equilibria compared to baselines that ignore population structure.

By Aditya Makkar, Benjamin Unger, Jeongyeol Kwon, Mathieu Lauri\`ere, Eugene Vinitsky, Yonathan Efroni
arXiv AI
Aug 26

Algorithmic Impact Reveals the Hidden Social Choice Structure of Alignment

The paper reinterprets AI alignment as a social choice problem, framing it as linear optimization over a convex impact space. This approach links alignment protocols to welfare outcomes, enabling the use of welfare economics and mechanism design tools. The authors demonstrate strategyproof, unanimous mechanisms like voting-by-issues and random-dictatorship, and derive alignment protocols that maximize utilitarian welfare while respecting harm constraints, validated on real human preference data.

By Zachary Wojtowicz, Michelle Si, Finale Doshi-Velez, Ariel Procaccia