arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
arXiv:2605. 03357v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents.
By Gr\'egoire Lambrecht, Mathieu Lauri\`ere
arXiv:2606. 29980v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Zero-shot Transfer in Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to train an agent that can generate optimal policies for any reward function, without additional learning at transfer time, while training only on reward-free trajectories.
By Louis Bagot (SyCoSMA), Mathieu Lefort (LIRIS, SyCoSMA, IRISA, MALT, UR), La\"etitia Matignon (SyCoSMA)
The paper introduces state abstractions that preserve the difference of Q‑functions for offline reinforcement learning, aiming to exclude irrelevant dynamics from rich state data. It proposes a dynamic generalization of the R‑learner that uses orthogonal estimation and sparse learning to estimate the Q‑function contrast, achieving faster convergence and consistency under a margin condition. Experiments on simulated and simulator‑augmented real data show variance reductions and demonstrate that the necessary information for sequential decision‑making can be smaller than that required for full state prediction.
By Defu Cao, Angela Zhou
arXiv:2607. 19232v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) intends to separate strategic planning from primitive execution.
By Kshitij Kumar Srivastava, Kshitij Jerath
The paper studies repeated principal-agent games in a multi-armed bandit setting where the principal offers arm-specific incentives, the agent chooses an arm to maximize its own reward plus incentive, and the principal observes only the chosen arm and its own reward. Because the principal cannot see the agent’s reward, traditional estimation fails, so the authors develop an estimator based on the sequence of incentives and chosen arms, analogous to online inverse optimization. Using this estimator, they design a policy that achieves low (square‑root) regret and validate the approach with simulations for personalized incentive design in long‑term statin treatment.
By Ilgin Dogan, Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Anil Aswani