The paper proposes a mean‑field reinforcement learning framework that models rewards and transitions as functions of an unknown low‑dimensional aggregate statistic of a large agent population. By learning this low‑dimensional representation in an offline setting, the authors demonstrate a provable method for obtaining near‑optimal policies. Experiments on a one‑step routing game inspired by supply‑chain problems show that, with a fixed neural‑network size and optimization budget, the learned representation improves reward prediction and the quality of Nash equilibria compared to baselines that ignore population structure.
By Aditya Makkar, Benjamin Unger, Jeongyeol Kwon, Mathieu Lauri\`ere, Eugene Vinitsky, Yonathan Efroni
arXiv:2405. 16668v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Adversarial Imitation Learning (AIL) faces challenges with sample inefficiency because of its reliance on sufficient on-policy data to evaluate the performance of the current policy during reward function updates.
By Yilei Chen, Vittorio Giammarino, James Queeney, Ioannis Ch. Paschalidis
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
By Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
The paper introduces Dually Regularized AIL, a model‑free algorithm for adversarial imitation learning that jointly applies KL policy regularization and a quadratic reward penalty based on expert and learner occupancies. It proves fast convergence rates, achieving a ×O(1/K+1/N) bound on the regularized imitation gap in finite‑horizon MDPs with general function approximation, and establishes the first algorithm to attain ×O(1/ε) sample complexity in both expert demonstrations and online interactions for this regularized objective.
By Hanbin Zhou, Shangzhe Li, Alexander Braverman, Weitong Zhang
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos