arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
arXiv:2609.00504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show t...
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2608. 12753v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized multi-player reinforcement learning in episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) under three forms of information asymmetry: (A) unobserved actions with common rewards, (B) observed actions with independent rewards, and (C) unobserved actions with independent rewards.
arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
arXiv:2608. 05327v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication.
Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication.
arXiv:2606. 01159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $\alpha/m$.