For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2609.06467v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: In performative reinforcement learning the deployed policy shapes the environment that generates the learner's future data, and the natural solution co...
By Debmalya Mandal
arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
By Ioannis Anagnostides, Weiqiang Zheng
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
By Geelon So, Yi-An Ma
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
By Taira Tsuchiya
arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
By Luis Leal
arXiv:2608.24731v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We settle the minimax-optimal alternating regret, a regret notion motivated by alternating learning dynamics in games, for both online linear optimizat...
By Yixin Tao, Weiqiang Zheng
arXiv:2606. 01159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $\alpha/m$.
By S Akash, Pratik Gajane
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
The paper introduces Anchored Neighborhood Optimization (ANO), a new policy‑optimization method that directly designs a smooth, bounded gain field for the probability‑ratio surrogate objective. ANO anchors the identity map at a ratio of one, peaks at a specified trust‑region boundary, and limits the influence of extreme off‑policy samples while providing a bounded, redescending pull on outliers. Empirical results show ANO consistently outperforms existing methods on Atari and MuJoCo benchmarks, and it remains robust under aggressive learning‑rate settings.
By Yiheng Zhang, Yiming Wang, Kaiyan Zhao, Zhenglin Wan, Jiayu Chen, Leong Hou U
arXiv:2609.00504v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show t...
By Asrin Efe Yorulmaz, Ugur Aydin, Tamer Basar