Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication.
arXiv:2608. 05327v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication.
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
arXiv:2608. 07532v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast.
arXiv:2607. 14877v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions.
The paper introduces Fed‑LSVI, a federated online reinforcement learning algorithm that uses linear function approximation in episodic Markov decision processes. It achieves a regret bound of ≥O(√{Md^3H^4T}) while only exchanging compressed sufficient statistics, thereby meeting privacy constraints. The method reduces communication cost to logarithmic in the number of episodes, a marked improvement over previous approaches that required linear communication.
arXiv:2608. 12753v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized multi-player reinforcement learning in episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) under three forms of information asymmetry: (A) unobserved actions with common rewards, (B) observed actions with independent rewards, and (C) unobserved actions with independent rewards.
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
arXiv:2602. 16965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the decentralized multi-player stochastic bandit problem over a continuous, Lipschitz-structured action space where hard collisions yield zero reward.
arXiv:2604. 10727v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Classical information-theoretic learning bounds typically rely on KL mutual information and moment-generating-function (MGF) arguments, which are well matched to bounded or sub-Gaussian losses but can be ineffective when losses or rewards are heavy-tailed.
arXiv:2608. 10526v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by decentralized applications, we study cooperative multi-agent bandits in continuous (Lipschitz) action spaces when the Lipschitz constant is unknown.
arXiv:2603. 13356v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Robust reinforcement learning typically assumes that feedback sources are either globally trustworthy or corrupted within a fixed global budget.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.