arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
arXiv:2609. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$.
arXiv:2609.16751v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve c...
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon...
arXiv:2608.24731v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We settle the minimax-optimal alternating regret, a regret notion motivated by alternating learning dynamics in games, for both online linear optimizat...
arXiv:2609.22839v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can simple learning rules keep their regret bounded in self-play? Recent work achieves constant regret bounds through modified regularization and hig...
arXiv:2608. 12753v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized multi-player reinforcement learning in episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) under three forms of information asymmetry: (A) unobserved actions with common rewards, (B) observed actions with independent rewards, and (C) unobserved actions with independent rewards.
arXiv:2607. 19854v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study horizon-free regret minimization for finite-horizon time-homogeneous tabular Markov decision processes with $S$ states, $A$ actions, horizon $H$, and per-trajectory total reward bounded by $1$.
arXiv:2606. 27448v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies the problem of regret minimization in Markovian bandits with \emph{non-observable states} and possibly \emph{constrained} decision epochs.
arXiv:2606. 02655v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: External regret certifies stability only against replacing one's behavior by a fixed alternative.
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
arXiv:2607. 23333v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We revisit the regret loss framework introduced in Park et al.
arXiv:2609.36486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study an unknown-transition finite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) with a finite collection of known reward functions $\{r^1, r^2, \ldots, r^M...