arXiv Machine Learning July 14, 2026 By Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu, Luke Marris

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

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arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.

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Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.

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