arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
arXiv:2607. 17543v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In two-player zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria form a convex set, regularized solvers such as Regularized Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) empirically select the maximum-entropy member: the information projection (I-projection) of a uniform reference onto the Nash set.
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
arXiv:2606. 01159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $\alpha/m$.
arXiv:2607. 19854v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study horizon-free regret minimization for finite-horizon time-homogeneous tabular Markov decision processes with $S$ states, $A$ actions, horizon $H$, and per-trajectory total reward bounded by $1$.
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
arXiv:2607. 13402v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials. Recent work addresses this by evaluating the sequence of per-round expected rewards through the generalized $p$-mean, interpolating between utilitarian welfare ($p=1$), Nash welfare ($p\to0$), and Rawlsian fairness ($p\to-\infty$).
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2606. 02655v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: External regret certifies stability only against replacing one's behavior by a fixed alternative.
arXiv:2608. 06762v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Bisimulation metrics quantify behavioral similarity in Markov decision processes, but their Wasserstein fixed-point operator updates every state pair and incurs quadratic pairwise work.