arXiv:2607. 23367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study whether strictly positive marginal values restore the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) for indivisible goods.
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.
The paper investigates the compatibility of envy-freeness and equitability in fair division, focusing on both indivisible goods and chores. It shows that the relaxed notions EF1+EQ1 may not exist even for normalized additive valuations, but provides an algorithm that finds an EF1+EQ1 allocation for up to seven agents with binary goods. For chores, the authors prove that a stronger EFX+EQX guarantee always exists, regardless of normalization, and they also explore cross-notion ex‑ante and ex‑post fairness guarantees.
arXiv:2608. 03171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations.
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
arXiv:2610.15520v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with arbitrary positive weights and additive nonnegative cost functions. An...
arXiv:2608.24400v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study multilevel fair resource allocation with tree-structured hierarchical relations among agents. At each level, the problem can be viewed local...
arXiv:2610.20587v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value...
arXiv:2609. 03846v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW).
arXiv:2608.29097v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies the problem of proportionally fair clustering, where the goal is to select $k$ ``centers'' from a metric space that fairly represe...
The paper proves that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium for a polytope game is PPAD‑complete, showing it is polynomial‑time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. It introduces the notion of a fixed set—a finite set contained in the convex hull of its image under a continuous function—and demonstrates that computing such a fixed set is PPAD‑hard even at inverse polynomial precision.