The paper investigates the compatibility of envy-freeness and equitability in fair division, focusing on both indivisible goods and chores. It shows that the relaxed notions EF1+EQ1 may not exist even for normalized additive valuations, but provides an algorithm that finds an EF1+EQ1 allocation for up to seven agents with binary goods. For chores, the authors prove that a stronger EFX+EQX guarantee always exists, regardless of normalization, and they also explore cross-notion ex‑ante and ex‑post fairness guarantees.
By Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak, Lirong Xia, Chengkai Zhang
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
By Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa
arXiv:2608. 03171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations.
By Thanasis Lianeas, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Minas Marios Sotiriou
arXiv:2608.24400v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We study multilevel fair resource allocation with tree-structured hierarchical relations among agents. At each level, the problem can be viewed local...
By Maxime Lucet, Nawal Benabbou, Aur\'elie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
By Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael J. Wooldridge
arXiv:2609. 03846v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW).
By Zih-Sian Yang, Yi-Hao Chen, Yu-Te Kuan, Cheng-Jui Wu, Chuang-Chieh Lin, Po-An Chen
arXiv:2601. 17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities.
By Seyed Majid Zahedi, Rupert Freeman
arXiv:2603. 14372v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination.
By Sagi Ohayon, Boaz Taitler, Omer Ben-Porat
arXiv:2606. 08267v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity.
By Elija Perrier
arXiv:2606. 15369v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective.
By Fran\c{c}ois Bachoc, Roberto Colomboni, Emilie Kaufmann
The paper introduces a new online fair division framework where a learner must allocate indivisible items to agents in real time, balancing fairness and efficiency. Traditional methods rely on many copies of each item to estimate utilities, but this is unrealistic for platforms with many users and few interactions. By treating utility as an unknown function of item-agent features and framing the problem as a contextual bandit, the authors propose algorithms that achieve sublinear regret and demonstrate their effectiveness experimentally.
By Arun Verma, Indrajit Saha, Makoto Yokoo, Bryan Kian Hsiang Low
The paper studies a budget‑constrained welfare problem for pooled testing, where agents have heterogeneous utilities and independent probabilities of being healthy. It proves that an optimal dynamic testing policy can achieve at most twice the welfare of the best static overlapping allocation, regardless of population, budget, or pool‑size limit. The authors also identify cases where adaptivity offers no benefit, show that re‑pooling after positive tests is necessary for strict gains, and provide approximation guarantees for greedy algorithms.
By Edwin Lock, Nicholas Lopez, Francisco Marmolejo-Coss\'io, Jose Roberto Tello Ayala, David C. Parkes