arXiv:2607. 23367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study whether strictly positive marginal values restore the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) for indivisible goods.
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
arXiv:2608. 03171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations.
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
arXiv:2601. 17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities.
arXiv:2603. 14372v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination.
arXiv:2606. 08267v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity.
arXiv:2606. 15369v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective.
arXiv:2607. 26273v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider a stochastic multi-objective bandit problem where, at each round, the agent selects a slate of $k$ arms and observes their $d$-dimensional reward vectors under semi-bandit feedback.
arXiv:2605. 01961v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Learning from human preference data is becoming a useful tool, from fine-tuning large language models to training reinforcement learning agents.
arXiv:2605. 00762v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study meritocratic fairness in budgeted combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback, where a learner selects at most $K$ arms per time step and observes only the noisy aggregate reward of the selected set.
We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations.
arXiv:2603. 17925v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider a variant of sequential testing by betting where, at each time step, the statistician is presented with multiple data sources (arms) and obtains data by choosing one of the arms.