EFX Allocation In (Multi)Hypergraphs
arXiv:2608. 03171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations.
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
arXiv:2608. 03171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations.
arXiv:2607. 23367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study whether strictly positive marginal values restore the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) for indivisible goods.
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
arXiv:2607. 23500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Razborov's flag algebra method is a powerful tool for proving asymptotic inequalities in extremal graph theory, often reducing the task to finding a finite certificate by semidefinite programming.
arXiv:2608. 05327v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication.
Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication.
arXiv:2608. 07532v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast.
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.
arXiv:2607. 26273v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider a stochastic multi-objective bandit problem where, at each round, the agent selects a slate of $k$ arms and observes their $d$-dimensional reward vectors under semi-bandit feedback.
arXiv:2602. 21312v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This work considers a number of optimization problems and reductive relations between them.
arXiv:2603. 14372v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination.
This paper studies additive regret in the multi-secretary problem, defined as the gap between the expected offline prophet reward and the reward of the best online policy. Prior work established \(O(\log T)\) regret for bounded-density distributions with connected support and \(O((\log T)^2)\) upper bounds for bounded-density distributions with support gaps.