arXiv AI

Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees

The paper investigates the compatibility of envy-freeness and equitability in fair division, focusing on both indivisible goods and chores. It shows that the relaxed notions EF1+EQ1 may not exist even for normalized additive valuations, but provides an algorithm that finds an EF1+EQ1 allocation for up to seven agents with binary goods. For chores, the authors prove that a stronger EFX+EQX guarantee always exists, regardless of normalization, and they also explore cross-notion ex‑ante and ex‑post fairness guarantees.

arXiv AI
Oct 23

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.

By Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenh\"auser
arXiv AI
Jul 21

Content Creation with Spillovers: An Incentive Design Approach

arXiv:2603. 14372v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination.

By Sagi Ohayon, Boaz Taitler, Omer Ben-Porat