arXiv AI

Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees

The paper investigates the compatibility of envy-freeness and equitability in fair division, focusing on both indivisible goods and chores. It shows that the relaxed notions EF1+EQ1 may not exist even for normalized additive valuations, but provides an algorithm that finds an EF1+EQ1 allocation for up to seven agents with binary goods. For chores, the authors prove that a stronger EFX+EQX guarantee always exists, regardless of normalization, and they also explore cross-notion ex‑ante and ex‑post fairness guarantees.

arXiv AI
Jul 21

Content Creation with Spillovers: An Incentive Design Approach

arXiv:2603. 14372v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination.

By Sagi Ohayon, Boaz Taitler, Omer Ben-Porat
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies

The paper introduces a new online fair division framework where a learner must allocate indivisible items to agents in real time, balancing fairness and efficiency. Traditional methods rely on many copies of each item to estimate utilities, but this is unrealistic for platforms with many users and few interactions. By treating utility as an unknown function of item-agent features and framing the problem as a contextual bandit, the authors propose algorithms that achieve sublinear regret and demonstrate their effectiveness experimentally.

By Arun Verma, Indrajit Saha, Makoto Yokoo, Bryan Kian Hsiang Low