Optimally Selecting Representative Agents from a Metric Space
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.
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