arXiv AI
Oct 23

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.

By Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenh\"auser
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 10

A Sub-4 Approximation for Fair $k$-Means

arXiv:2609.07974v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fairness in clustering has attracted sustained research interest, motivated by the need to ensure equitable representation of protected groups in mac...

By Kangke Cheng, Guanlin Mo, Shihong Song, Hu Ding