arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
By Ioannis Anagnostides, Weiqiang Zheng
arXiv:2610.03621v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than nor...
By Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm, Brian Hu Zhang
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
By Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu, Luke Marris
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
By Luis Leal
arXiv:2606. 17000v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We prove that computing approximate stationary points of min-max optimization over the hypercube is PPAD-hard for quadratic polynomials.
By Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alexandros Hollender