The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.
By Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenh\"auser
arXiv:2607. 23367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study whether strictly positive marginal values restore the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) for indivisible goods.
By Nicholas Teh
arXiv:2608.24400v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We study multilevel fair resource allocation with tree-structured hierarchical relations among agents. At each level, the problem can be viewed local...
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arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
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By Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael J. Wooldridge
We prove that computing a complete contiguous $\varepsilon$-envy-free cake allocation is PPAD-complete for normalized rational piecewise-constant additive valuations. The hardness holds even when $\va...