Scratched Lenses, Shifted Depth: Passive Camera-Side Optical Attacks
Read the original on arXiv Computer Vision →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computer Vision.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computer Vision.
The paper presents 3DGAA, a fabrication-first framework that generates view-consistent, geometry-preserving adversarial wraps for vehicles using 3D Gaussian splatting optimization. It ensures consistency across viewpoints, illumination, and occlusion while limiting changes to vehicle geometry, producing realistic print-only textures that significantly reduce detection confidence and average precision in simulations and physical tests. Ablation and efficiency studies analyze the impact of physical filtering, augmentation, and shape-consistency regularization, and the method demonstrates robustness against common preprocessing defenses and cross-detector transferability.
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ComplicitSplat is a novel black‑box attack that leverages 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) shading to create viewpoint‑specific camouflage, embedding adversarial content into scene objects that is only visible from certain angles. The method does not require access to model architecture or weights and can successfully fool a range of popular object detectors—including single‑stage, multi‑stage, and transformer‑based models—on both real‑world physical objects and synthetic scenes. This demonstrates that downstream models using 3DGS are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation.