arXiv:2610.10436v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Adversarial perturbations can alter the predictions of frozen vision-language models (VLMs) while leaving their confidence and image--text similarity p...
By Arash Vashagh, Roozbeh Razavi-Far
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
arXiv:2608.29510v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Aerial object detection is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, but models remain vulnerable to physical, universal adversarial patches...
By Haoran Wang, Matthew Lau, Alec Helbling, Matthew Hull, ShengYun Peng, Mansi Phute, Martin Andreoni, Willian T. Lunardi, Duen Horng Chau, Wenke Lee
arXiv:2610.08331v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The rapid integration of Vision Language Models (VLMs) into sensitive systems introduces critical safety vulnerabilities that remain unexplored in ex...
By Heyam Bin Jahlan Areej Alhothali Abeer Alhothali
arXiv:2608.20748v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The Visual Geometry Grounded Transformer (VGGT) enables unified feed-forward 3D reconstruction from multi-view images. However, deploying such a high-p...
By Qi Song, Ziyuan Luo, Haoliang Han, Renjie Wan
While Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), represented by LLaVA and GPT-4V, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, their visual inputs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, posing significant security risks. Existing defense methods predominantly target single-task scenarios (e.
Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.
arXiv:2610.06977v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) remain vulnerable to transferable adversarial examples, especially in black-box settings where only open-sou...
By Xiaojun Jia, Simeng Qin, Yiming Li, Jie Liao, Sensen Gao, Ke Ma, Yang Liu, Xiaochun Cao
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
By Ilan Zini, Boussad Addad, Katarzyna Kapusta
arXiv:2608. 16031v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections.
By Yuting Wu, Dongfang Guo, Xiangzhong Luo, Qun Song, Rui Tan
arXiv:2607. 18958v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), represented by LLaVA and GPT-4V, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, their visual inputs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, posing significant security risks.
By Sibo Wang, Jie Zhang, Shiguang Shan, Xilin Chen, Wen Gao
arXiv:2606. 24388v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce a large-scale, open-source dataset of pre-generated adversarial attacks for vision-language models (VLMs).
By Simone Gallivanone, Hossein Khodadadi, Mauro Dore, Mauro Medda, Nicola Franco