The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
By Ilan Zini, Boussad Addad, Katarzyna Kapusta
arXiv:2606. 24388v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce a large-scale, open-source dataset of pre-generated adversarial attacks for vision-language models (VLMs).
By Simone Gallivanone, Hossein Khodadadi, Mauro Dore, Mauro Medda, Nicola Franco
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
arXiv:2607. 11560v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-language agents (VLAs) are increasingly used to interpret complex driving scenes and support safety-critical reasoning.
By Tianyuan Zhang, Zonglei Jing, Jiangfan Liu, Ligong Zhang, Ke Ma, Chengzhi Sun, Xiaohai Xu, Zhirui Zhang, Qianqian Xu, Qingming Huang, Hanyu Fang, Junhua Liu, Zheng Wang, Xiaoliang Liu, Yuanbo Li, Shuai Gui, Bin Wang, Menghe Zheng, Jing Nie, Hanyang Meng, Zeyang Zhang, Xiang Zhang, Yongxuan Zhu, Rui Ding, Hainan Li, Yongkang Zhang, Zhilei Zhu, Xianglong Kong, Jin Hu, Zonghao Ying, Yisong Xiao, Lei Chen, Haotong Qin, Jiakai Wang, Aishan Liu, Ruikai Li, Julia Karbing, Yinpeng Dong, Zhenfei Yin, Shao Jing, Xia Hu, Jingyi Xu, Juntao Dai, Xinyun Chen, Vishal M. Patel, Xianglong Liu, Dawn Song, Alan Yuille, Philip H. S. Torr, Dacheng Tao
While Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), represented by LLaVA and GPT-4V, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, their visual inputs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, posing significant security risks. Existing defense methods predominantly target single-task scenarios (e.
arXiv:2607. 25522v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of video generation models has led to the increasing misuse of image-to-video (I2V) models.
By Yimao Guo, Zuomin Qu, Wei Lu
The paper introduces TempJail, a temporal jailbreak framework targeting image‑to‑video generation models. It exploits a newly identified vulnerability where unsafe semantics arise from the composition of frames over time, rather than from single‑frame violations. By decomposing malicious captions into visual conditions and temporal instructions, and by employing controlled latent perturbations and template rewriting, TempJail achieves a 23.3 % higher attack success rate than prior methods on several commercial models.
By Qi Lu, Zehui Guo, David Yuanda Gan, Zijing Li, Hengda Zhang, Weijun Xu, Qiankun Zhang
Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.
arXiv:2602.08136v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are now a core part of modern AI. Recent work proposed several visual jailbreak attacks using single/ holistic...
By Md Rafi Ur Rashid, MD Sadik Hossain Shanto, Vishnu Asutosh Dasu, Shagufta Mehnaz
arXiv:2608. 07750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have found successful deployment in numerous vision perception systems.
By Cong Chen, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Jonathan Petit
By leveraging data from video-based perception systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) support safety-critical applications that improve road safety. However, adversaries may manipulate video frames to compromise downstream perception modules, causing failures in safety-critical functions and increasing risks to vulnerable road users.