arXiv:2607. 17077v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial attacks against vision models like object detectors are often evaluated under limited conditions, leaving their performance under-characterized.
By Mansi Phute, Alexander Greenhalgh, Matthew Hull, Haoran Wang, Alec Helbling, ShengYun Peng, Elliott Faa, Willian Lunardi, Martin Andreoni, Wenke Lee, Duen Horng Chau
Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.
arXiv:2403. 00420v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) is a subfield of machine learning for training autonomous agents that take sequential actions across complex environments.
By Lucas Schott, Josephine Delas, Hatem Hajri, Elies Gherbi, Reda Yaich, Nora Boulahia-Cuppens, Frederic Cuppens, Sylvain Lamprier
arXiv:2608.20748v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The Visual Geometry Grounded Transformer (VGGT) enables unified feed-forward 3D reconstruction from multi-view images. However, deploying such a high-p...
By Qi Song, Ziyuan Luo, Haoliang Han, Renjie Wan
arXiv:2608. 16031v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections.
By Yuting Wu, Dongfang Guo, Xiangzhong Luo, Qun Song, Rui Tan
Recent advancements in LiDAR-only 3D object detection have demonstrated improved detection accuracy over benchmark datasets. However, the adversarial robustness of these models remains untested.
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
By Ilan Zini, Boussad Addad, Katarzyna Kapusta
arXiv:2608. 10403v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promising performance in autonomous driving, yet ensuring the safety of online RL policies remains challenging due to insufficient exposure to safety-critical driving scenes.
By Xincong Hu (Nanjing University), Lei Ou (Nanjing University), Maosen Li (Yinwang Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd), Jingtao Zhang (Yinwang Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd), Liguo Hou (Yinwang Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd), Zongzhang Zhang (Nanjing University)
arXiv:2608.30839v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Thermal Infrared detection is widely used in autonomous driving, medical AI, etc., but its security has only attracted attention recently. We propose i...
By Xiaopei Zhu, Siyuan Huang, Zhanhao Hu, Jianmin Li, Jun Zhu, Xiaolin Hu
The paper presents 3DGAA, a fabrication-first framework that generates view-consistent, geometry-preserving adversarial wraps for vehicles using 3D Gaussian splatting optimization. It ensures consistency across viewpoints, illumination, and occlusion while limiting changes to vehicle geometry, producing realistic print-only textures that significantly reduce detection confidence and average precision in simulations and physical tests. Ablation and efficiency studies analyze the impact of physical filtering, augmentation, and shape-consistency regularization, and the method demonstrates robustness against common preprocessing defenses and cross-detector transferability.
By Yixun Zhang, Lizhi Wang, Junjun Zhao, Wending Zhao, Feng Zhou, Yonghao Dang, Jianqin Yin
arXiv:2511. 04949v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Rapid advances in generative AI have led to increasingly realistic deepfakes, posing growing challenges for law enforcement and public trust.
By Tharindu Fernando, Clinton Fookes, Sridha Sridharan
arXiv:2607. 06484v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Poisoning attacks against public datasets lead to major concerns, such as (i) misclassification of perceived objects when the poisoned data is used for training and (ii) embedding of backdoors that may eventually be triggered later on, when specific conditions in the system apply over the learned models.
By Marwan Lazrag, Badis Hammi, Lorena Gonzalez-Manzano, Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro