Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked.
arXiv:2607. 22545v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deploying large language models in financial-services and agentic settings requires safety classifiers that simultaneously handle prompt injection, regulatory compliance, and general harm, a combination no existing open guardrail addresses in a single inference pass.
By Tejasvi C. Addagada
arXiv:2606. 25487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade.
By Yang Gao (Veyon Solutions)
arXiv:2608. 08126v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Credit scoring increasingly relies on models whose decision logic cannot be read off their parameters, in tension with supervisory expectations that adverse decisions be explainable.
By Gregorius Reynaldi Pratama, Kuo-Kun Tseng
The paper introduces a new taxonomy for benchmark contamination that categorizes leakage by the mitigation it defeats—direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired—covering both training‑time and evaluation‑time scenarios. It proposes a four‑field disclosure protocol to record contamination status alongside benchmark scores, and provides a JSON schema, validator, and examples. An empirical study of 41 documents using a pre‑registered instrument shows limited reporting of contamination types and variable reliability, highlighting gaps in current disclosure practices.
By Johanna Angulo, V\'ictor Yeste, Hector Espinos-Morato
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
By Yongxi Zhou, Junwei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Wenbo Ye, Jiaxi Wen, Lai Yun Choi
arXiv:2608. 16147v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Class-imbalance handling is routinely evaluated on a single benchmark dataset, and the resulting conclusions are reported as if they were properties of the method.
By Diyorbek Musaev
arXiv:2610.01535v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Safety routers send each request to one of several models and are judged against the best single model. A major routing benchmark picks that comparat...
By Amit Singh Bhatti, Vishal Vaddina
arXiv:2608.21570v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Deploying a safety layer for large language models on commodity hardware is constrained by the guards available to do it: current open guard models hol...
By Edson Rodrigues da Cruz Filho, Paulo Ricardo Ferreira Neves, Paulo Henrique Eleuterio Falsetti, Jo\~ao Vitor Pavan, Ian Degaspari, Henrique Vieira Laturrague, Patrick Vieira Laturrague, Guilherme Nielsen Dias, Marccello Wilson Perez Berto, Gustavo Voltani Von Atzingen
arXiv:2605. 17173v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit safety degradation in non-English languages.
By Max Zhang, Ameen Patel, Sang T. Truong, Sanmi Koyejo
arXiv:2609.38827v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Direct-decision models turn text into low-latency structured labels and scores, making them attractive for classification and automatic evaluation. Yet...
By Tianxiang Gao, Jinzhe Li, Zhiyuan Li, Yi Chang, Yuan Wu
arXiv:2608. 14617v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A recurring proposal in legal AI is to improve case-outcome prediction by fusing uncertainty tools (evidence graphs with belief propagation, sequential Bayesian odds updating, Dempster-Shafer combination, and conformal prediction) into one pipeline.
By Surya Saka