arXiv:2609.00654v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We describe the SciTrue team's participation in both subtasks of the NTCIR-19 SciClaimEval task~\cite{sciclaimeval}, which asks systems to verify scien...
By Qiming Bao, Ne\c{s}et \"Ozkan Tan, Siyuan Wang, Mark Gahegan
The paper investigates how benchmark contamination—leakage of test items into training data—affects large language model (LLM) leaderboards. By comparing original test items with semantically equivalent paraphrases, the authors measure contamination as a violation of anchor-item invariance and find that it inflates absolute scores but rarely changes model rankings. Across 47 public models and 74 finetuned models on four benchmarks, the rank correlation between standard and paraphrase-controlled leaderboards is 0.997, with only a handful of cases showing differential contamination that could alter rankings.
By Xingyao Xiao (Stanford University), Yihong Cheng (City University of Macau)
arXiv:2610.20417v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Audits of large language model (LLM) extraction from full-length documents report severe unreliability, leaving two questions open: what the failures a...
By Jiahong Qian
The paper evaluates CASCADE, a fully local layered defense for Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based systems, by conducting a component ablation and corpus audit on a fixed 5,000-sample dataset. It demonstrates that the choice of aggregation convention heavily influences reported metrics, that detection performance varies with provenance, and that the released configuration does not fully disclose the operating point. The study also shows that a local review model invoked for a third of requests does not alter classification outcomes, highlighting the importance of reproducibility and transparency in defense evaluations.
By \.Ipek Abas{\i}kele\c{s} Turgut, Edip G\"um\"u\c{s}
TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.
By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
The paper introduces a distribution‑free certification layer that can be applied to any crash‑severity prediction model without modifying the model itself. It provides guarantees for ordinal outcomes, per‑class validity, transfer of coverage to unobserved severities, and one‑sided certificates under deployment shift, all grounded in a functional of the true data law. The framework is evaluated on 5.2 million Texas records, demonstrating a model‑independent lower bound on set width for vulnerable road users and is released as an open‑source package with theorem‑level tests.
By Amir Rafe, Subasish Das