arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2606. 25097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Speculative decoding accelerates inference by letting a draft model propose tokens for a target model to verify, raising a concrete safety question: at temperature zero, can draft-side behavior leak into safety-scored outputs?
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
arXiv:2607. 15218v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as high-level planners for embodied agents, where linguistically benign instructions can become unsafe once grounded in the physical world.
arXiv:2607. 19257v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade.
arXiv:2608. 08029v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Khatri et al.
arXiv:2603. 10044v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: A safety score earned on a benchmark need not predict how the same model behaves once it is wrapped in an agentic scaffold the benchmark never tested.