arXiv AI By Yongxi Zhou, Junwei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Wenbo Ye, Jiaxi Wen, Lai Yun Choi

Single Canonical Prompts Underestimate LLM Safety's Surface-Form Sensitivity

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arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.

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