The paper examines allocation mechanisms that rely on manipulable characteristics and shows that naive optimal rules lead to falsification and inefficiency. It characterizes optimal falsification‑proof rules across various falsification technologies and identifies an honesty condition under which these rules solve the planner’s unconstrained problem of maximizing a weighted sum of allocative surplus and agents’ welfare.
arXiv:2601. 17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities.
arXiv:2610.15520v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with arbitrary positive weights and additive nonnegative cost functions. An...
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.
arXiv:2507. 09473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports.
The paper investigates the compatibility of envy-freeness and equitability in fair division, focusing on both indivisible goods and chores. It shows that the relaxed notions EF1+EQ1 may not exist even for normalized additive valuations, but provides an algorithm that finds an EF1+EQ1 allocation for up to seven agents with binary goods. For chores, the authors prove that a stronger EFX+EQX guarantee always exists, regardless of normalization, and they also explore cross-notion ex‑ante and ex‑post fairness guarantees.
arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.
The paper introduces Correlation-Aware Affine Maximizer Auctions (CA-AMA), a new framework that extends traditional AMAs by incorporating a correlation-aware payment structure. CA-AMA maintains dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and is formulated as a constraint optimization problem with individual rationality constraints. The authors theoretically demonstrate that CA-AMA can achieve optimal revenue in scenarios where classic AMAs perform poorly, and they present a practical two-stage training algorithm that empirically finds near-optimal CA-AMA solutions with improved revenue and minimal IR violations.
arXiv:2610.20587v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value...
arXiv:2608.24400v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study multilevel fair resource allocation with tree-structured hierarchical relations among agents. At each level, the problem can be viewed local...