The paper introduces Correlation-Aware Affine Maximizer Auctions (CA-AMA), a new framework that extends traditional AMAs by incorporating a correlation-aware payment structure. CA-AMA maintains dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and is formulated as a constraint optimization problem with individual rationality constraints. The authors theoretically demonstrate that CA-AMA can achieve optimal revenue in scenarios where classic AMAs perform poorly, and they present a practical two-stage training algorithm that empirically finds near-optimal CA-AMA solutions with improved revenue and minimal IR violations.
arXiv:2606. 10112v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Characterizing revenue-optimal auctions for multi-item, multi-bidder settings remains a fundamental open problem, with no known closed-form solution existing beyond restrictive binary-type instances.
arXiv:2507. 09473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports.
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
arXiv:2609.33289v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents operating in multi-product markets must make sequential decisions under information asymmetry and reso...
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.
We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$.
arXiv:2603. 27049v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI-assisted task delegation is increasingly common, yet human effort in such systems is costly and typically unobserved.
arXiv:2604. 05845v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Auto-bidding services optimize real-time bidding strategies for advertisers under key performance indicator (KPI) constraints such as target return on investment and budget.
The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.
arXiv:2602. 03778v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Tail-end risk measures such as static conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) are used in safety-critical applications to prevent rare, yet catastrophic events.
arXiv:2602. 08261v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Auto-bidding systems strive to maximize marketing value while maintaining high compliance with efficiency constraints, such as Target Cost-Per-Action (CPA).
arXiv:2607. 00641v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Advances in generative AI are rapidly increasing the quality and commercial value of generated music, and this progress depends on large catalogs of creators' recordings.