arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.
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The paper investigates proportional representation in a temporal voting setting where a single candidate is chosen each round and voters submit ranked preferences that may evolve over time. It extends classic proportionality axioms—justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC)—to accommodate various ways of determining which top-ranked candidates are considered approved, ranging from a fixed common cutoff to individual, round‑specific cutoffs. The authors analyze which axioms can be guaranteed under different informational assumptions about future rounds, showing that while EJR is unattainable, JR, PJR, and PSC can be achieved with a fixed cutoff if all preferences are known in advance; varying cutoffs reduce guarantees, yet PJR can still be achieved efficiently for groups that agree in every round, and PSC can be satisfied without future knowledge. They also demonstrate that checking these axioms is often coNP‑complete, though some stronger axioms may be easier to verify.
arXiv:2607. 25484v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In some real applications a plan may later become unfeasible due to newly imposed budget constraints, yet, at the same time, using only the original actions of the plan and their order is mandatory.
arXiv:2608.23247v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce multi-winner voting with argumentative ballots (MVArg) and investigate theoretical properties. As our conceptual contribution, we genera...
arXiv:2503. 01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences.
The paper investigates the Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule (RevSeqPAV) used in approval-based committee elections. It examines the rule’s performance in terms of proportional representation—specifically Extended Justified Representation and related metrics—and its ability to approximate the maximum PAV score. The authors first present strong negative results for general election instances, then identify specific settings where RevSeqPAV offers meaningful fairness and optimization guarantees.
arXiv:2606. 11164v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long chain-of-thought (CoT) trajectories in large language model (LLM) reasoning cause severe inference bottlenecks due to rapid key-value (KV) cache growth.