Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency. Optimizing the rule...
arXiv:2610.15520v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We investigate the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with arbitrary positive weights and additive nonnegative cost functions. An...
By Trung Thanh Nguyen, Khaled Elbassioni, J\"{o}rg Rothe
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
By Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael J. Wooldridge
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
By Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa
The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.
By Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenh\"auser
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.
By Lauri Lov\'en, Sasu Tarkoma