Agentic systems increasingly gate actions on a model's own stated confidence, which assumes confidence tracks correctness at the moment of acting. We test this in a hidden-information chess variant wh...
arXiv:2607. 10814v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did.
By Yuan Gao, Jiangyi Yang, Yao Zhao, Yichi Zhang
The study shows that large language model (LLM) agents are far more likely to commit to a directional prediction when presented with a professional‑looking market panel than when asked the same question directly, with commitment rates rising from 6.5% to 54.0% across 12 frontier models. Even when the panel’s data is entirely fabricated, commitment still increases significantly, indicating that the authority of the presentation, rather than the truth of the information, drives confident action. The authors demonstrate that this act/don’t‑act decision gate is narrow, model‑specific, and can be mitigated through supervised fine‑tuning, though its effectiveness depends on response format and context.
whyItMatters":"The findings reveal a specific vulnerability in LLMs where presentation style can override factual accuracy, highlighting the need for careful design and training to prevent misleading confidence in uncertain scenarios."
By Pranav Aggarwal
The paper shows that large language model agents are far more likely to commit to a directional answer when presented with a professional-looking market panel, even if the panel’s data is fabricated. Across 12 frontier models, commitment rates jump from 6.5 % for a bare question to 54.0 % with evidence, and remain high (≈37 %) even when all numbers are invented. The study finds that the act/don’t‑act decision gate is the key failure point, can be trained to reduce false commitments, but is fragile to response format changes.
arXiv:2608. 04240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Superhuman game engines in domains like chess have made expert-level evaluations easily accessible, yet they communicate what is true without the natural-language explanations that make such expertise educationally useful to experts and non-experts alike.
By S. Ashwin Hebbar, Peiyao Sheng, Sewoong Oh, Pramod Viswanath
The paper investigates whether frozen language models can detect a corrupted reward signal by using a single verified record in a two‑option game. In the game, a payout swap and a lying reporter produce identical histories, but a single line confirming the true outcome allows the models to almost perfectly identify the liar. However, the models frequently misclassify honest reporters as liars, with error rates ranging from 26% to 58% depending on model size and wording, indicating a significant limitation in their ability to interpret verified data.
By Arman Nik Khah
arXiv:2509. 05624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: How much information about an agent's underlying values can be recovered from its observable behavior?
By Jason Starace, Terence Soule
arXiv:2608. 14617v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A recurring proposal in legal AI is to improve case-outcome prediction by fusing uncertainty tools (evidence graphs with belief propagation, sequential Bayesian odds updating, Dempster-Shafer combination, and conformal prediction) into one pipeline.
By Surya Saka
arXiv:2607. 19369v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Hidden-state probes often recover latent labels in imperfect-information sequence models, but this alone does not establish that a model maintains a posterior belief distribution over hidden states.
By Quanhao Li, Qianyu Chen
arXiv:2604. 23057v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We investigate whether explicit belief graphs improve LLM performance in cooperative multi-agent reasoning.
By Yuqi Sun, Tianqin Meng, George Liu, Yashraj Panwar, Lakshya Chaudhry, Munasib Ilham, Aman Chadha
arXiv:2608. 03744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace.
By Sebasti\'an Andr\'es Cajas Ord\'o\~nez, Agastya Munnangi, Aldo Marzullo, Felipe Ocampo Osorio, Quang Bui, Mohammad Shahin, Armaan Grewal, Emmanuel Paul Kwesiga, Anqi Peter Li, Josephine Nanyonjo, Aaditya Panchal, Arshnoor Bhutani, Nikhil Jaiswal, Milit S. Patel, Maximin Lange, Leo Anthony Celi
arXiv:2607. 12397v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents act in external environments where each action changes the state that later decisions condition on, and where a single wrong step can waste interaction budget or trigger irreversible side effects long before the final failure is observed.
By Yaopei Zeng, Congchao Wang, JianHang Chen, Nan Wang, Yurui Chang, Lu Lin