arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
By Enric Junque de Fortuny, Veronica Roberta Cappelli
EpiAgent introduces an explicit, learnable epistemic layer for large language model agents, enabling them to maintain and update beliefs about other agents’ private information. The framework splits the policy into Epistemic Update and Action Planning stages, optimized via a bi‑level Epistemic Self‑Play algorithm that rewards accurate belief predictions. Experiments in mixed and competitive settings show EpiAgent outperforms prompting and RL baselines, highlighting the benefits of dedicated epistemic training for belief inference and action planning.
By Xuanfa Jin, Xinyu Cui, Zhijian Ma, Xue Yan, Jian Zhao, Haifeng Zhang, Jun Wang
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.
By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu
arXiv:2607. 01661v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent systems are increasingly used for forecasting future events, as deliberation among multiple LLMs is believed to improve reasoning and calibration.
By Yuante Li, Yicheng Tao, Kate Zhang, Taozhi Wang, Gefei Gu, Yaxin Zhou
Multi-agent systems are increasingly used for forecasting future events, as deliberation among multiple LLMs is believed to improve reasoning and calibration. Yet existing approaches overlook a critical design choice: what information each agent receives.
The paper introduces the Preference-Behavior Model (PBM), which jointly infers Large Language Model (LLM) preferences and imperfect decision-making mechanisms from observed choices. By applying PBM to three social dilemma games—Public Goods, Collective-Risk, and Common-Pool Resource—the authors show that preferences derived from one dilemma can predict behavior in others, whereas traditional behavioral economic elicitation instruments fail to do so consistently. The study also evaluates how well inferred preferences align with persona instructions, revealing both broad agreement and specific divergences across dimensions, LLMs, and games.
By Axel Abels, Elias Fern\'andez Domingos, Tom Lenaerts