The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) correctly gauge their confidence when acting in a hidden‑information chess variant. In experiments where the location of a hidden royal piece is repeatedly relocated, the models’ stated probabilities about the piece’s position were almost never accurate at high confidence levels, with a calibration deficit concentrated in those high‑confidence events. Across multiple model configurations and providers, the same pattern emerged, and conventional evaluation metrics such as legality, cost, latency, and completion rate were found to be uncorrelated with belief quality, yet a model could still win the game despite poor confidence estimates.
By Bhushan Kashinath Joshi
The paper shows that large language model agents are far more likely to commit to a directional answer when presented with a professional-looking market panel, even if the panel’s data is fabricated. Across 12 frontier models, commitment rates jump from 6.5 % for a bare question to 54.0 % with evidence, and remain high (≈37 %) even when all numbers are invented. The study finds that the act/don’t‑act decision gate is the key failure point, can be trained to reduce false commitments, but is fragile to response format changes.
The study shows that large language model (LLM) agents are far more likely to commit to a directional prediction when presented with a professional‑looking market panel than when asked the same question directly, with commitment rates rising from 6.5% to 54.0% across 12 frontier models. Even when the panel’s data is entirely fabricated, commitment still increases significantly, indicating that the authority of the presentation, rather than the truth of the information, drives confident action. The authors demonstrate that this act/don’t‑act decision gate is narrow, model‑specific, and can be mitigated through supervised fine‑tuning, though its effectiveness depends on response format and context.
whyItMatters":"The findings reveal a specific vulnerability in LLMs where presentation style can override factual accuracy, highlighting the need for careful design and training to prevent misleading confidence in uncertain scenarios."
By Pranav Aggarwal
arXiv:2607. 10814v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did.
By Yuan Gao, Jiangyi Yang, Yao Zhao, Yichi Zhang
The paper investigates whether frozen language models can detect a corrupted reward signal by using a single verified record in a two‑option game. In the game, a payout swap and a lying reporter produce identical histories, but a single line confirming the true outcome allows the models to almost perfectly identify the liar. However, the models frequently misclassify honest reporters as liars, with error rates ranging from 26% to 58% depending on model size and wording, indicating a significant limitation in their ability to interpret verified data.
By Arman Nik Khah
arXiv:2608. 04240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Superhuman game engines in domains like chess have made expert-level evaluations easily accessible, yet they communicate what is true without the natural-language explanations that make such expertise educationally useful to experts and non-experts alike.
By S. Ashwin Hebbar, Peiyao Sheng, Sewoong Oh, Pramod Viswanath
arXiv:2604. 23057v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We investigate whether explicit belief graphs improve LLM performance in cooperative multi-agent reasoning.
By Yuqi Sun, Tianqin Meng, George Liu, Yashraj Panwar, Lakshya Chaudhry, Munasib Ilham, Aman Chadha
arXiv:2509. 05624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: How much information about an agent's underlying values can be recovered from its observable behavior?
By Jason Starace, Terence Soule
arXiv:2607. 12397v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents act in external environments where each action changes the state that later decisions condition on, and where a single wrong step can waste interaction budget or trigger irreversible side effects long before the final failure is observed.
By Yaopei Zeng, Congchao Wang, JianHang Chen, Nan Wang, Yurui Chang, Lu Lin
LLM agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-week decision tasks in which the state that drives cost is never directly observed. On such tasks the final cost cannot say why an agent failed: it may have misread the world, or read it correctly and still failed to act (the knowing-doing gap).
arXiv:2607. 25655v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Among chess opening positions that a strong engine judges essentially equal (Stockfish 18 evaluation within 10 centipawns of zero, depth-stable) and that humans actually reach on Lichess (October 2025; 1,661 positions, 16.
By Jesung Park
arXiv:2608. 14617v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A recurring proposal in legal AI is to improve case-outcome prediction by fusing uncertainty tools (evidence graphs with belief propagation, sequential Bayesian odds updating, Dempster-Shafer combination, and conformal prediction) into one pipeline.
By Surya Saka