Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages are a cornerstone of connected vehicle (CV) safety, enabling CVs to perceive and respond to intersection state through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehic...
arXiv:2608. 05548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, whose design prioritizes low cost and real-time performance but provides no message authentication or encryption.
arXiv:2606. 18599v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats.
The paper presents a digital‑twin (DT) based intrusion detection system (IDS) for vehicle powertrain CAN bus traffic, modeling physical relationships among decoded signals to detect payload‑manipulation attacks that preserve normal timing and sequencing. Using a shared‑encoder LSTM trained on 17 Hyundai/Kia CAN signals, the DT flags anomalies when residuals exceed a threshold, achieving high detection rates (up to 94.6%) for stealthy attacks such as continuous drift and masquerade, while a range‑and‑plausibility baseline fails to detect them. The study demonstrates that learning coupled vehicle dynamics enables detection of payload‑level attacks that evade traditional timing‑based IDSs, though false positives remain a challenge.
arXiv:2606. 28625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Connected Vehicles (CVs) rely extensively on communication technologies to enable data-driven predictive analyses for enhancing performance and safety.
arXiv:2606. 30430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing connectivity of modern vehicles has made securing in-vehicle communication networks a critical challenge.
Existing automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) largely target discrepancies in message timing, frequency, or sequencing and cannot detect attacks that pre...
arXiv:2512. 15503v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vehicular platooning promises transformative improvements in transportation efficiency and safety through the coordination of multi-vehicle formations enabled by Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication.
arXiv:2607. 16175v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) rely on interconnected software and hardware components, including sensors, Electronic Control Units, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and telematics units, where vulnerabilities can compromise assets, users, and vehicle operations.
By leveraging data from video-based perception systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) support safety-critical applications that improve road safety. However, adversaries may manipulate video frames to compromise downstream perception modules, causing failures in safety-critical functions and increasing risks to vulnerable road users.
The paper introduces TrustFlip, an attack that exploits consistency‑based defenses in vehicular collaborative perception by deploying physical adversarial objects to create inconsistent observations among benign vehicles. This misattribution lowers the trust score of a targeted vehicle, leading to its exclusion from the collaboration and a degradation of perception performance. The authors evaluate the attack across multiple architectures, showing it can remove a benign vehicle in up to 87.7% of scenarios and reduce Average Precision by up to 13%, and propose a mitigation called TrustReflect that reduces the attack success rate by 35–100%.
Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.