The paper introduces SPADE, a labelled, multi‑modal dataset for detecting attacks on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages from the perspective of connected vehicles. Generated via Eclipse MOSAIC, SPADE includes 1.89 million timestep records across six attack classes and one benign class, combining SPaT fields, camera confidence scores, and V2V peer data over 40 features. The dataset, along with generation code and scenario configurations, is publicly released on GitHub to enable reproducible deep‑learning intrusion detection research in C‑V2X security.
By James Di Novo, Hany Ragab, Sylvain P. Leblanc
arXiv:2609.06961v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Existing car-following prediction methods mainly optimize trajectory accuracy, while rarely considering whether predicted disturbances propagate realis...
By Yuhang Wang, Kailang Ma, Zirui Li, Mingfeng Fan, Kitae Jang, Changju Lee, Heye Huang
arXiv:2606. 28625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Connected Vehicles (CVs) rely extensively on communication technologies to enable data-driven predictive analyses for enhancing performance and safety.
By Mohammad Imtiaz Hasan, Abyad Enan, Jean Michel Tine, Araf Rahman, M Sabbir Salek, Mashrur Chowdhury
SPADE is a labelled, multi‑modal, simulation‑based dataset for detecting attacks on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages from the perspective of connected vehicles. It contains 1.89 million timestep records generated by injecting six classes of application‑layer attacks and one benign class into the SAE J2735 SPaT protocol, across multiple intersection geometries, operating conditions, and random seeds. Each record fuses SPaT fields, onboard camera confidence scores, and cooperative V2V peer data into 40 features, enabling deep‑learning intrusion detection systems to distinguish deliberate attacks from environmental noise.
arXiv:2607. 20505v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Surrogate safety measures (SSMs) enable proactive traffic safety assessment, but many existing methods evaluate pairwise interactions independently or flatten multi-agent scenes into fixed feature vectors, limiting their ability to represent heterogeneous interaction structure and evolving scene-level risk.
By Md Monzurul Islam, Subasish Das
The paper introduces TrustFlip, an attack that exploits consistency‑based defenses in vehicular collaborative perception by deploying physical adversarial objects to create inconsistent observations among benign vehicles. This misattribution lowers the trust score of a targeted vehicle, leading to its exclusion from the collaboration and a degradation of perception performance. The authors evaluate the attack across multiple architectures, showing it can remove a benign vehicle in up to 87.7% of scenarios and reduce Average Precision by up to 13%, and propose a mitigation called TrustReflect that reduces the attack success rate by 35–100%.
By Yutong Liu, Chenyi Wang, Ming F. Li, Qingzhao Zhang