arXiv:2608.23446v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the problem of formally explaining why a candidate was not selected by a given tournament rule, by identifying sub-tournaments in which th...
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
The paper investigates proportional representation in a temporal voting setting where a single candidate is chosen each round and voters submit ranked preferences that may evolve over time. It extends classic proportionality axioms—justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC)—to accommodate various ways of determining which top-ranked candidates are considered approved, ranging from a fixed common cutoff to individual, round‑specific cutoffs. The authors analyze which axioms can be guaranteed under different informational assumptions about future rounds, showing that while EJR is unattainable, JR, PJR, and PSC can be achieved with a fixed cutoff if all preferences are known in advance; varying cutoffs reduce guarantees, yet PJR can still be achieved efficiently for groups that agree in every round, and PSC can be satisfied without future knowledge. They also demonstrate that checking these axioms is often coNP‑complete, though some stronger axioms may be easier to verify.
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
arXiv:2608. 09128v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent social settings where they must cooperate, negotiate, and adapt to other agents.
arXiv:2508. 11874v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Designing polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria (ANE) with provable worst-case guarantees is a fundamental open problem in algorithmic game theory.
arXiv:2610.00577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In a district-based election, N voters are partitioned into k districts, and each voter votes for one of m candidates. Each district elects a winner...
arXiv:2608. 09586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts tournament chips into reference prize equity, and policies are routinely constructed against those values.
arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
arXiv:2608.23247v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce multi-winner voting with argumentative ballots (MVArg) and investigate theoretical properties. As our conceptual contribution, we genera...
arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.
arXiv:2510. 20454v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Intransitive player dominance, where player A beats B, B beats C, but C beats A, is common in competitive tennis.