arXiv AI By Muntaser Syed, Markus Zanker, Marius Silaghi

Rules Before Oracles: Auditable, User-Configurable Argument Selection for Deliberative Polling

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The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.

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