The paper argues that new interactional concepts are needed to understand how humans change when engaging with large language models (LLMs). Drawing on enactive theory and the notion of Linguistic Bodies, it proposes that humans incorporate LLMs both as tools that enable specific skills and as linguistic partners that shape identity and language use. The authors introduce the idea of "susceptive sense‑making" to describe the heightened semiotic labor involved when friction is absent in these interactions, and suggest that this dynamic may affect users’ autonomy and development.
arXiv:2606. 07722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This article offers a perspective on the nature of chatbots as genuine conversation partners when discussing problems in relation to their solutions.
The article examines chatbots as partners in problem‑solving conversations, arguing that basic chatbots—comprising a large language model (LLM) and a simple interface—are multifaceted but cannot match human cognitive flexibility. Drawing on Aggregation Dynamics, Cognitive Linguistics, Neuropsychology, and Psychology, the authors describe how LLMs encode artificial metaphorical problem propagations from training data, which only partially imitate human thinking. They conclude that further LLM development will not yield true thinking partners, yet chatbots are widely used, making their understanding socially and politically important.
The paper argues that large language models (LLMs) should not be viewed as conversational partners but as sophisticated text-generating artifacts. It introduces the concept of an artifactual stance, framing human‑AI interaction as exchanges of candidate texts optimized for utility rather than meaningful utterances. By rejecting the illusion of dialogue, the authors suggest that philosophical concerns about identity, responsibility, and truth in AI interactions are misplaced, and instead focus should shift to the normative design and use of these artifacts.
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
arXiv:2609.38486v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and more broadly Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are often described and understood in human-like terms, a phenomen...
arXiv:2409. 01754v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: From the printing press to social media, innovations in communication technology have repeatedly reshaped how ideas spread through human culture.
arXiv:2502.09192v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to technology, is an automatic and unconscious response that occurs even in those with advance...
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
Language captures only a subset of the perceptions, intuitions and intents that form meaning between speakers. What, then, are the limits of language? We take steps towards measuring this in LLMs as f...
arXiv:2607. 07891v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Roy Harris's Integrationist linguistics offers a compelling critique of the referentialist tradition embedded deep at the heart of computational approaches to language, arguing that language is not a code that maps onto a pre-given world but a situated, bipartite activity oriented toward prospective joint action.
arXiv:2608. 08443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Previous studies have shown that people can develop shared symbols, partner-specific expressions, personal idioms, inside jokes, and other parts of a relational microculture.
The paper introduces Synthetic Linguistic Agency (SLA), a framework that defines linguistic agency in terms of embodiment, participation, and precariousness. It presents two studies: one that operationalizes SLA criteria and identifies existing systems, and another that builds an Embodied Mortal Agent (EMA) using mortality‑grounded reinforcement learning. Experiments show the EMA’s linguistic choices depend on its body and social history, influence partner behavior, and adapt over time, demonstrating SLA in an artificial agent.