arXiv AI By Ziqi Liao, Jiaqi Shen, Yiming Na, Kedi Lyu, Shao-Yuan Lo, Hongxia Xie

Who Knows What - and What Does It Support? Perspective-Bounded Evidence Calibration for Multimodal Theory of Mind

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The paper introduces PIP-ToM, a framework that addresses the evidence-admissibility problem in multimodal Theory of Mind (ToM) by ensuring that only evidence accessible to an agent and diagnostic of its mental state is used in hypothesis evaluation. PIP-ToM builds agent‑specific evidence stores, aligns them with structured mental‑state claims, and calibrates Bayesian inference scores while preserving the underlying inference process. Using GPT‑4o, the method outperforms existing ToM approaches on MuMA‑ToM, MMToM‑QA, and Hi‑ToM benchmarks, achieving accuracies of 92.56%, 95.00%, and 95.00% respectively.

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