arXiv:2607. 23333v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We revisit the regret loss framework introduced in Park et al.
arXiv:2609.16751v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve c...
arXiv:2609. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon...
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
The paper investigates the problem of sharing a single critic across multiple parallel environments in reinforcement learning. It shows that when environments assign different expected returns to the same state, a shared critic must reconcile conflicting value targets, which can distort advantage estimates and misguide policy updates. The authors propose a simple fix—providing the critic with the environment index—demonstrating through bandit models and experiments on CartPole, MuJoCo, BipedalWalker, and 16 Procgen games that this conditional critic stabilizes learning and boosts returns, achieving a 40.8% improvement in aggregate normalized return on unseen levels.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
The paper introduces a two-player zero-sum repeated game between a learner and nature that simultaneously captures Bayesian updating and an exact decomposition of exponential-weights regret. The game’s terminal payoff reflects the maximum gain a comparator can achieve given a fixed relative entropy from the prior, while the one-step constraint limits nature’s move by an information budget. The resulting regret splits into three precise components—per-round information loss, an additive retempering drift, and the comparator’s information relative to the prior—providing a unified framework that explains concentration phenomena, large-deviation bounds, and various learning methods such as bandits, posterior sampling, aggregation, and boosting.
arXiv:2609.09466v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that firs...
arXiv:2609.22839v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can simple learning rules keep their regret bounded in self-play? Recent work achieves constant regret bounds through modified regularization and hig...