arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2602. 06902v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In this paper, we study dynamic regret in unconstrained online convex optimization (OCO) with movement costs.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
The paper introduces a straightforward framework that transforms dynamic regret minimization into switching regret minimization by constructing an unbiased random sequence for any comparator sequence. Using this reduction, the authors derive dynamic regret bounds for strongly convex and exp-concave losses of “~O(T^{1/3}P_T^{2/3})” and for general convex losses of “O(√{T(1+P_T)})”, matching known minimax optimal results. The approach leverages off-the-shelf switching regret algorithms and controlled variance to achieve these bounds.
arXiv:2609.09466v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that firs...
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
arXiv:2606. 02363v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study sequential decision-making in partially observable environments against strategic, adaptive opponents, modeled as partially observable Markov games (POMGs).
arXiv:2606. 27448v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies the problem of regret minimization in Markovian bandits with \emph{non-observable states} and possibly \emph{constrained} decision epochs.
arXiv:2609.13547v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study switching regret in adversarial multi-armed bandits, where the learner competes with an arm sequence that changes at most $S$ times. When $S$...
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
arXiv:2603. 28201v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We revisit the standard perturbation-based approach of Abernethy et al.
arXiv:2306. 02704v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework.