arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2602. 06902v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In this paper, we study dynamic regret in unconstrained online convex optimization (OCO) with movement costs.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
arXiv:2606. 02363v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study sequential decision-making in partially observable environments against strategic, adaptive opponents, modeled as partially observable Markov games (POMGs).
arXiv:2606. 27448v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies the problem of regret minimization in Markovian bandits with \emph{non-observable states} and possibly \emph{constrained} decision epochs.