arXiv:2609. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$.
By Tung Mai
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon...
arXiv:2608. 04149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games.
By Taira Tsuchiya
The paper presents an uncoupled learning algorithm, higher-order optimism with discounting (HOOD), for arbitrary N-player normal form games with up to K actions per player. HOOD achieves an individual regret bound of O(N³ log² K) uniformly over the play horizon by combining a discounted (N+1)-th order predictor with entropic regularization over a lifted strategy space. This design mitigates large oscillations in play, addressing a key challenge in prior attempts to attain constant regret in general games.
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2607. 23333v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We revisit the regret loss framework introduced in Park et al.
By Chanwoo Park, Asuman Ozdaglar
arXiv:2608. 31166v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon.
By Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar
arXiv:2609.21976v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We introduce Multiplicatively Optimistic Regret Matching (MORM), an uncoupled learning rule for finite general-sum games. Under simultaneous full-inf...
By Ashkan Soleymani, Georgios Piliouras
arXiv:2609.22839v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Can simple learning rules keep their regret bounded in self-play? Recent work achieves constant regret bounds through modified regularization and hig...
By Junsoo Ha
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2602. 01903v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: This work studies online episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) with known transitions and develops best-of-both-worlds algorithms that achieve refined data-dependent regret bounds in the adversarial regime and variance-dependent regret bounds in the stochastic regime.
By Mingyi Li, Taira Tsuchiya, Kenji Yamanishi
arXiv:2606. 29533v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the problem of forecasting for an arbitrary number of downstream agents with unknown objectives, each of whom best responds to the forecaster's predictions.
By Joey Rivkin, Ramiro N. Deo-Campo Vuong, Robert Kleinberg, Chido Onyeze, Erald Sinanaj, Eva Tardos
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore