Hugging Face Trending Papers

SidConArena: An Environment Evaluating Agents in Open-Ended,Positive-Sum Bargaining Game

Evaluating LLM agents requires dynamic environments that go beyond static reasoning and zero-sum games. Real-world economic interaction is often open-ended and mixed-motive: agents must negotiate, create positive-sum surplus, compete for scarce assets, and plan under delayed returns.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 8

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.

By Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi
arXiv AI
Aug 21

The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).

By Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova, Yash Madhwal, Alisa Kalacheva, Dmitry Belousov, Ilia Zubov, Aleksei Smirnov, Denis Fedyanin, Vladimir Gorgadze, Yury Yanovich
arXiv AI
Aug 5

Towards Improving Sequential Decision-Making in LLM Agents via Experience Memory

arXiv:2608. 03420v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models have improved substantially on single-shot reasoning tasks, but their performance in sequential decision-making is less well understood.

By Jakub Rada (AI Center, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague), Viliam Lis\'y (AI Center, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague)
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 2

NashDreamer: Model-Based Reinforcement Learning for Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.

By Tom\'a\v{s} Hole\v{c}ek, Viliam Lis\'y