Learning to model other minds
We’re releasing an algorithm which accounts for the fact that other agents are learning too, and discovers self-interested yet collaborative strategies like tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. This algorithm, Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), is a small step towards agents that model other minds.
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