The paper introduces a scalable framework that uses decentralized markets of self‑interested agents to solve multi‑step tasks. It shows that when agents compete through sequential auctions, perfect competition fails because clones drive profits to zero, while no competition also collapses value extraction. By allowing heterogeneous agents to shade bids strategically, the authors demonstrate that imperfect competition can sustain profitable margins while still achieving high task success rates at low costs, evaluating four bidding algorithms across three auction protocols.
arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).
arXiv:2610.20587v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value...
arXiv:2606. 28943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge.
arXiv:2610.21711v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Repeated Bertrand competition is a stringent benchmark for algorithmic pricing: in homogeneous-goods markets, standard learning procedures typically...
arXiv:2609.37321v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Power markets are a natural testbed for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where multiple self-interested participants repeatedly submit bids...
arXiv:2608. 00123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-native advertising embeds sponsored content directly into model-generated responses, shifting the unit of sale from a fixed slot to a moment within an evolving conversation.
arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.
arXiv:2606. 05363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand?
arXiv:2608. 10529v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The multi-armed bandit problem is a central framework in sequential decision-making, extensively studied under sub-Gaussian reward assumptions.
The paper presents a reinforcement learning framework for training autonomous large language model agents to act as sellers in multi-product bargaining markets. It models the problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process and introduces a structured message protocol to map natural language into a regulated decision space. Using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards, the trained agents match limited inventory to buyers more effectively, achieving seller surplus extraction and allocation quality comparable to or better than trillion‑parameter models, and generalize to unseen market conditions.
The paper investigates how to infer agents’ underlying incentives in strategic multi‑agent settings, where traditional inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) may fail to produce rewards that guide optimal play. It introduces the concept of strategic identifiability and shows that learning from a fixed pair of policies can be insufficient regardless of sample size. To address this, the authors propose an active IRL algorithm for two‑player repeated Stackelberg games, combining maximum‑likelihood estimation with experimental design to achieve finite‑sample guarantees on sub‑optimality, and validate the approach in an anti‑poaching scenario.
The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.