arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.
By Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi
arXiv:2605. 13909v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation.
By Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu, Batu El, Jose Blanchet, Susan Athey, Jiashuo Liu, James Zou
arXiv:2606. 15866v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has become an effective post-training paradigm for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models.
By Qinjian Zhao, Zhihao Dou, Dinggen Zhang, Xiangyu Li, Chaoda Song, Zhongwei Wan, Xinpeng Li, Yanyan Zhang, Kaijie Chen, Qingtao Pan, Chengcheng Feng, Zhiqiang Gao, Xiaoyu Xia
arXiv:2606. 28943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge.
By Junhan Li, Yuxin Zhang, Haoran Wang, Minghao Chen
arXiv:2605. 00369v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study how large language models can be used to generate inventory policies in online settings with non-stationary demand.
By Chenyu Huang, Jianghao Lin, Zhengyang Tang, Bo Jiang, Ruoqing Jiang, Benyou Wang, Lai Wei
The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.
By Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
arXiv:2602. 08261v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Auto-bidding systems strive to maximize marketing value while maintaining high compliance with efficiency constraints, such as Target Cost-Per-Action (CPA).
By Binglin Wu, Yingyi Zhang, Xianneng Li, Ruyue Deng, Chuan Yue, Weiru Zhang, Xiaoyi Zeng
Dialogue systems in e-commerce scenarios often need to satisfy multiple objectives: accurately reasoning over user profiles (e. g.
arXiv:2606. 27397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents requires dynamic environments that go beyond static reasoning and zero-sum games.
By Yeqi Feng, Yuxin Chen, Tianxing He
arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).
By Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova, Yash Madhwal, Alisa Kalacheva, Dmitry Belousov, Ilia Zubov, Aleksei Smirnov, Denis Fedyanin, Vladimir Gorgadze, Yury Yanovich
arXiv:2607. 24779v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Online advertising bidding systems typically deploy multiple offline-trained expert models (e.
By Ji Wu, Yunshan Peng, Wentao Bai, Yunke Bai, Wenzheng Shu, Jinan Pang, Yanxiang Zeng, Xialong Liu
OneBid is a unified auto‑bidding foundation model that consolidates diverse cost‑per‑X (oCPX) advertising scenarios into a single framework. It builds on Decision Transformer by conditioning on two atomic signals—Return‑to‑Go for conversion value and Cost‑to‑Go for cost ratio—and incorporates value‑aware regularization. A sequence‑level Mixture‑of‑Experts architecture captures cross‑scenario knowledge while preserving low latency, and a Critic‑guided Relative Offline Policy optimization (CROP) aligns the backbone with scenario‑specific preferences without unsafe online exploration. In production at Kuaishou, OneBid achieved a 2.2% overall ADVV increase and up to 13.1% in the ROAS scenario.
By Yewen Li, Peng Jiang, Yitian Li, Pengfei Lv, Xialong Liu, Peng Jiang, Qingpeng Cai