arXiv AI

Learning to Sell: Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Large Language Model Agents in Multi-Product Markets

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 8

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.

By Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi
arXiv AI
Jun 16

STRIDE: Strategic Trajectory Reasoning via Discriminative Estimation for Verifiable Reinforcement Learning

arXiv:2606. 15866v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has become an effective post-training paradigm for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models.

By Qinjian Zhao, Zhihao Dou, Dinggen Zhang, Xiangyu Li, Chaoda Song, Zhongwei Wan, Xinpeng Li, Yanyan Zhang, Kaijie Chen, Qingtao Pan, Chengcheng Feng, Zhiqiang Gao, Xiaoyu Xia
arXiv AI
Sep 4

Data Market Design through Deep Learning

The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.

By Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
arXiv AI
Aug 21

The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).

By Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova, Yash Madhwal, Alisa Kalacheva, Dmitry Belousov, Ilia Zubov, Aleksei Smirnov, Denis Fedyanin, Vladimir Gorgadze, Yury Yanovich
arXiv AI
Sep 21

OneBid: A Unified Auto-Bidding Foundation Model for Diverse oCPX Advertising Scenarios

OneBid is a unified auto‑bidding foundation model that consolidates diverse cost‑per‑X (oCPX) advertising scenarios into a single framework. It builds on Decision Transformer by conditioning on two atomic signals—Return‑to‑Go for conversion value and Cost‑to‑Go for cost ratio—and incorporates value‑aware regularization. A sequence‑level Mixture‑of‑Experts architecture captures cross‑scenario knowledge while preserving low latency, and a Critic‑guided Relative Offline Policy optimization (CROP) aligns the backbone with scenario‑specific preferences without unsafe online exploration. In production at Kuaishou, OneBid achieved a 2.2% overall ADVV increase and up to 13.1% in the ROAS scenario.

By Yewen Li, Peng Jiang, Yitian Li, Pengfei Lv, Xialong Liu, Peng Jiang, Qingpeng Cai