arXiv:2607. 05462v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse.
By Edwin H. Wintermute, Harmon Bhasin, Christina M. Agapakis, Dianzhuo Wang, Evan Seeyave, Arjun Banerjee, Daniel Fulop, Matthew C. Watson, Adam J. Meyer, Sandrine Boissel, Jens H. Kuhn, Rishi Jain, Noah D. Taylor, Helena Shomar, Patrick M. Boyle, Kenny Workman
arXiv:2606. 11150v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly acquiring capabilities relevant to biological research, from literature synthesis to interpretation of experimental data.
By Andrew Bo Liu, Samira Nedungadi, Bryce Cai, Alex Kleinman, Harmon Bhasin, Seth Donoughe
arXiv:2609.16213v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-purpose large language...
By Candace S. Y. Chan, Aris Karatzikos, Ilias Georgakopoulos-Soares
arXiv:2606. 19899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks.
By Patricia Paskov, Jeffrey Lee, Kyle Brady, Alyssa Worland
arXiv:2607. 19262v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As pathogen genomic surveillance scales, the bottleneck is shifting from data generation to analysis.
By Harmon Bhasin, Kevin Flyangolts, Dianzhuo Wang, Evan Seeyave, Arjun Banerjee, Amanda Darling, Joshua Stallings, David Stern, Shawn Higdon, Claire Duvallet, Bryan Tegomoh, Kenny Workman
Advanced AI can transform biology and medicine—but also raises biosecurity risks. We’re proactively assessing capabilities and implementing safeguards to prevent misuse.
arXiv:2312.06632v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Artificial intelligence is rapidly advancing scientific discovery, but this progress carries risks of misuse, such as the creation of harmful subst...
By Jiyan He, Haoxiang Guan, Weitao Feng, Yaosen Min, Jingwei Yi, Kunsheng Tang, Shuai Li, Jie Zhang, Kejiang Chen, Wenbo Zhou, Xing Xie, Weiming Zhang, Nenghai Yu, Shuxin Zheng
Frontier large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into scientific workflows, yet their growing biological capabilities may outpace current safeguards. To assess the biological risks of frontier models, we develop Intern-BioBreaker, a specialized bio-red-teaming model, together with an integrated computational-to-physical framework that couples model-level stress testing with wet-lab validation.
arXiv:2601. 21800v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce BioAgent Bench, an evaluation suite designed for measuring the performance and robustness of AI agents in common bioinformatics tasks.
By Dionizije Fa, Marko Culjak, Bruno Pandza, Mateo Cupic
arXiv:2608.30165v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Scientific progress depends not only on finding solutions, but on learning the rules that explain why they work and using that understanding to desig...
By Arya S. Rao, Rodrigo I. Castro, Sager J. Gosai, Kenneth B. Hsu, Yasha Ektefaie, Shantanu Singh, Sangeeta N. Bhatia, Steven K. Reilly, Ryan Tewhey, Eric S. Lander, Pardis C. Sabeti
arXiv:2606. 08234v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based scientific agents have shown strong capacity for autonomous research, yet their safety layers remain structurally divorced from core reasoning: they inspect pipeline outputs rather than shaping the deliberation that produces them.
By Tanush Swaminathan, Runmin Jiang, Letian Zhang, Min Xu
arXiv:2607. 13411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clinical AI models can expose patients to harm when adversarial vulnerabilities go undetected, yet formal security auditing requires statistical expertise, specialized tools, and significant time.
By Michael O. Eniolade