Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance
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arXiv:2606. 19899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks.
arXiv:2606. 11150v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly acquiring capabilities relevant to biological research, from literature synthesis to interpretation of experimental data.
arXiv:2607. 05462v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse.
arXiv:2607. 05462v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse.
The article introduces Traceable Trust, a framework designed to guide the transition from AI-generated outputs to laboratory actions in bioscience. It outlines a reviewable process that evaluates evidence, claimed capabilities, delegated agency, action thresholds, override mechanisms, and feedback loops. Three case studies demonstrate how the framework can document trust as AI outputs influence scientific work.
Advanced AI can transform biology and medicine—but also raises biosecurity risks. We’re proactively assessing capabilities and implementing safeguards to prevent misuse.