arXiv:2606. 19899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks.
By Patricia Paskov, Jeffrey Lee, Kyle Brady, Alyssa Worland
arXiv:2606. 11150v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly acquiring capabilities relevant to biological research, from literature synthesis to interpretation of experimental data.
By Andrew Bo Liu, Samira Nedungadi, Bryce Cai, Alex Kleinman, Harmon Bhasin, Seth Donoughe
arXiv:2607. 05462v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse.
By Edwin H. Wintermute, Harmon Bhasin, Christina M. Agapakis, Dianzhuo Wang, Evan Seeyave, Arjun Banerjee, Daniel Fulop, Matthew C. Watson, Adam J. Meyer, Sandrine Boissel, Jens H. Kuhn, Rishi Jain, Noah D. Taylor, Helena Shomar, Patrick M. Boyle, Kenny Workman
arXiv:2607. 05462v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse.
By Edwin H. Wintermute, Harmon Bhasin, Christina M. Agapakis, Dianzhuo Wang, Evan Seeyave, Arjun Banerjee, Daniel Fulop, Matthew C. Watson, Adam J. Meyer, Sandrine Boissel, Jens H. Kuhn, Rishi Jain, Noah D. Taylor, Helena Shomar, Patrick M. Boyle, Kenny Workman
The article introduces Traceable Trust, a framework designed to guide the transition from AI-generated outputs to laboratory actions in bioscience. It outlines a reviewable process that evaluates evidence, claimed capabilities, delegated agency, action thresholds, override mechanisms, and feedback loops. Three case studies demonstrate how the framework can document trust as AI outputs influence scientific work.
By Huayu Xin, Yizhi Cai, Mukilan Deivarajan Suresh, Gavin Michael Farrell, Iwona Gajda, Charlie Harrison, Conor Houghton, Mato Lagator, Yang Lu, Virginia Portillo, Reyer Zwiggelaar, Sebastian Lobentanzer
arXiv:2610.19810v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models are increasingly competent at leveraging scientific knowledge and existing computational tools to execute complex workflows. At...
By Shiv Muthupandiyan, Tolga H. Dur, Mac Walker, Timo Flesch, Mahmoud Ghanem, Steph Suddell, Giles Harper-Donnelly, Sophie Rose, Jasper G\"otting, Coleman Breen, Jake Pencharz
DRYLAB‑Bench is a new benchmark that measures the biosecurity risk of large language models (LLMs) when they design biological mutations. It presents 30 hazardous mutation‑design scenarios and evaluates LLMs in a multi‑round, tool‑augmented setting, scoring designs against 187,695 empirical wet‑lab measurements using a Biosecurity Risk Score. Initial tests on 15 frontier models show that even without tools, a majority of designs exceed average risk, and tool use further amplifies the threat.
By Yuzhen Wang, Chunxiao Li, Baichen Le, Lewen Yan, Jie Zhang, Yucheng T. Yang, Xing-Ming Zhao, Lijun Li, Jing Shao
Advanced AI can transform biology and medicine—but also raises biosecurity risks. We’re proactively assessing capabilities and implementing safeguards to prevent misuse.
Frontier large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into scientific workflows, yet their growing biological capabilities may outpace current safeguards. To assess the biological risks of frontier models, we develop Intern-BioBreaker, a specialized bio-red-teaming model, together with an integrated computational-to-physical framework that couples model-level stress testing with wet-lab validation.
arXiv:2606. 12429v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Muse Spark is the latest large language model developed by Meta.
By Cristina Menghini (Sail), Peter Ney (Sail), Hamza Kwisaba (Sail), Zifan (Sail), Wang, Miles Turpin, Felix Binder, Jean-Christophe Testud, Aidan Boyd, Nathaniel Li, Ivan Evtimov, Klaudia Krawiecka, Arman Zharmagambetov, Jeremy Kritz, Alexander R. Fabbri, Daniel Song, Jinpeng Miao, Joonas Hjelt, Meghna Ramani, Leona Lan, Reza Aghajani, Joanna Bitton, Mahesh Pasupuleti, Devin Norder, Khalid El-Arini, Paridhi Singh, V\'itor Albiero, Sahana CB, Rashnil Chaturvedi, Elahe Dabir, Edoardo Debenedetti, Jim Gust, Ziwen Han, Kat He, Sean Hendryx, Lifeng Jin, Polina Kirichenko, Sandra Lefdal, Kenneth Li, Asad Liaqat, Inna Lin, Despoina Magka, Neal Mangaokar, Ishita Mediratta, Zach Miller, Smitha Milli, Niloofar Mireshghallah, Saba Nazir, Hung Nguyen, Maximilian Nickel, Kelvin Niu, Kerem Oktar, Bhargavi Paranjape, Parth Pathak, Maya Pavlova, Emmanuel Ramirez, David Renardy, Candace Ross, Yasha Sheynin, Claudia Shi, Shivam Singhal, Evangelia Spiliopoulou, Rakshith Sharma Srinivasa, Jamelle Watson-Daniels, Spencer Whitman, Adina Williams, Chen Xing, Andy Zou, Tommy Ma, Siqi Deng, James Beldock, Prashant Ratanchandani, Kate Plawiak, Taesung Lee, Ryan Victory, Lindsay Hundley, Rachad Alao, Himaghna Bhattacharjee, Jianfeng Chi, Gary Frost, Pegah Ghahremani, Niki Howe, Yuheng Huang, Saeed Jahed, Hannah Korevaar, Trang Le, Zhe Liu, Jinghong Luo, Qin Lyu, Nina Mehrabi, Abraham Montilla, Chirag Nagpal, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Rajvardhan Oak, Manoj Ravi, Vidya Sarma, Aman Shankar, Alana Shine, Eric Michael Smith, Mariana Tandon, Michael Tontchev, Caoyu Wang, Zihan Wang, Corinne Wong, Zheng Wu, Hongyuan Zhan, Justin Zhao, Zexuan Zhong, Chengxu Zhuang, Tristan Goodman, Ayaz Minhas, Harrison Rudolph, Victoria Jeffries, Ingrid Dickinson, Alex Vaughan, Lauren Deason, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Julian Michael, Shengjia Zhao, Summer Yue
The paper introduces Traceable Trust, a framework designed to guide the transition from AI-generated outputs to laboratory actions in bioscience. It outlines a reviewable process that evaluates evidence, claimed capabilities, delegated agency, action thresholds, override authority, and feedback mechanisms. Three case studies demonstrate how the framework can document trust as AI outputs influence scientific work.
The paper introduces FUSE, a modular framework that evaluates large language models (LLMs) for dangerous capabilities across three orthogonal pipelines: Knowledge (K), Defense (D), and Harm (H). Using a chemical‑biological module, the authors assess 12 commercial LLMs, revealing divergent profiles among models and families, and showing that newer models increase knowledge while only partially improving defense. The framework’s reliability is supported by high cross‑judge consistency and low inter‑pipeline correlations.
By Zhengyi Jin, Ru Zhang, Xiao Chen, Xinbo Liu, Jiaxuan Lin, Jia Huang, Jianyi Liu, Zhen Yang