arXiv Machine Learning
Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games
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Algorithmic Collusion and the Complexity of Information-Value-Free Equilibria
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
arXiv Machine Learning
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Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
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Which Nash Equilibrium? Solver-Dependent Selection on Zero-Sum Nash Polytopes
arXiv:2606. 28308v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour.
arXiv AI
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Independent Reinforcement Learning in Discounted Markov Games
arXiv:2609.00504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show t...
arXiv Machine Learning
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Sublogarithmic Swap Regret in Multiplayer General-Sum Games via Hybrid Regularization
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Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 13
Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.