arXiv:2606. 27909v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives.
By Avni Mittal
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan
arXiv:2607. 11607v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Distributional reinforcement learning agents learn full return distributions that are increasingly read at face value: for interpretability, risk-sensitive control, and safety monitoring.
By Hari Prasad
arXiv:2605. 06340v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Continuous post-deployment compliance audits, mandated by emerging regulations such as the EU AI Act and Digital Services Act, create a class of strategic gaming distinct from the one-shot input/output gaming studied in prior work.
By Florian A. D. Burnat, Brittany I. Davidson
arXiv:2606. 00914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts.
By Rana Muhammad Usman
arXiv:2603. 13356v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Robust reinforcement learning typically assumes that feedback sources are either globally trustworthy or corrupted within a fixed global budget.
By Majid Ghasemi, Mark Crowley